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ABSTRACT 
 
Initialising and managing security parameters for 
personal mobile devices within a Personal Area 
Network (PAN) presents a variety of security problems.  
In this paper we consider one possible paradigm for 
mobile device security management, namely the use of 
a ‘personal CA’ to provide certificates within a PAN.  
The security requirements for such a personal CA are 
analysed, and a novel protocol for secure public key 
registration and certification is described and discussed.  
The ongoing management issues for a personal CA are 
also considered. 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
The next generation of mobile communications is 
expected to be different from current systems.  We 
foresee changes both for the type of accesses to the 
networks and the terminals used to access the networks.  
We expect future multi-function mobile terminals to 
consist of several different configurable components, 
which may be worn about the body and are connected 
through local wireless communication.  The IST 
SHAMAN (Security for Heterogeneous Access in 
Mobile Applications and Networks) project (see 
http://www.ist-shaman.org) addresses 
security problems for distributed dynamically 
configurable terminals.  A distributed terminal consists 
of several components in physical proximity to each 
other and the user or users.  They are interconnected 
with local communication links such as short-range 
wireless connections, e.g. Bluetooth.  This type of 
personal local network is often called a Personal Area 
Network (PAN).  A PAN is a collection of fixed, 
portable, or moving components close to one person 
(typically within 10 meters).  In order for the user to be 
confident in using a PAN, the communication between 
the PAN components must be secured.  Secure 
communication can be achieved by proper security 
protocols and suitable security associations between the 
PAN components.  Security associations can be created 
in several different ways.  In this paper we introduce a 
new concept that provides the means for user friendly 
and fast set up of security associations between PAN 
components.  We call our concept: “The personal CA”. 
 
In a ‘conventional’ Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) 
model, a Certification Authority (CA) issues a public 
key certificate.  The CA is responsible for checking that 
the public key in an issued certificate corresponds to a 
private key that the holder (with the ID given in the 
certificate) of the certificate possesses.  This is 
necessary in order to maintain the security of a global or 
very large PKI.  The drawbacks of a central CA include: 
• it must issue all certificates used by the 
communication units, and all units must share 
trusted public root keys; this can be a tedious 
process that the user of a communication unit 
would like to avoid; 
• it is very costly to maintain a well-controlled highly 
secure certification process that can handle 
thousands of users; 
• a user that wants to manage his/her own local 
environment, such as a PAN, will gain few benefits 
within the PAN from employing a centralised CA; 
• the user might not want, for privacy reasons, to 
delegate the CA operation to a centralised entity 
outside his personal environment. 
 
Nevertheless, a PKI would be a convenient solution for 
creating security associations in a PAN.  We seek a 
solution that is adapted to the local PAN environment 
and that minimises the necessary user interaction.  
Furthermore, we would like to maintain a reasonable 
security level.  Our personal CA concept provides this. 
 
II. REQUIREMENTS FOR A PERSONAL CA 
 
A personal CA is different from large scale or global 
CA functions.  The personal CA is used by an ordinary 
user for home or small office deployment.  As with any 
other PKI, we would like all units in a communication 
network to share common root public keys and use 
certificates issued by a trusted CA corresponding to the 
public root key.  In order to use PKI technology in such 
an environment we need to reconsider the CA policies.  
One of the personal components must act as a “personal 
CA”.  Such a component is able to issue certificates to 
all other personal components.  Hence, since all the 
personal components can be equipped with certificates 
issued by the same CA, i.e., the personal CA, they will 
all share a common root public key.  Consequently, the 
public keys in the certificates can be used to exchange 
session keys or authenticate personal components in a 
PAN. 
 
Below we discuss the functional requirements for the 
personal CA and the security requirements on a PKI for 
a PAN. 
 
A. The Personal CA component 
 
We assume that one of the PAN components is defined 
as the personal CA.  Preferably the component should 
have a display and a keypad.  Examples of possible 
personal CA components are mobile phones, PDAs or 
PCs.  A personal CA component might be pre-
configured (at the manufacturer) with a private/public 
key pair or might be able to generate such a key pair.  
The personal CA is used to initialise other PAN 
components.  Here we slightly extend the “resurrecting 
duckling” model of Stajano and Anderson, [4]. 
 
At manufacture a component does not have an owner or 
users.  Instead, the component is made first party by an 
initialisation or (as in [4]) at an imprinting phase (see 
section III).  At the imprinting phase the necessary keys 
and certificates are securely transferred to the 
component that can be used to identify the component 
to all other first party components of the same owner. 
 
The personal CA key pair should be securely generated 
within the device, or securely generated and transferred 
to the device at manufacture, and (in both cases) the 
private key securely stored when on the device.  PAN 
components should be able to verify certificates issued 
by the personal CA, and check certificate validity and 
revocation status when appropriate. 
 
Additional and optional functional requirements on the 
personal CA are: 
• the security-critical personal CA functionality 
(including key generation and storage functions) 
should preferably be removable, personal and 
transferable; 
• the security-critical personal CA functionality can 
be directly verified and readily enabled/disabled 
from a single gateway and/or master user. 
 
B. Security requirements 
 
It is the owner that is responsible for the primary 
imprinting of his/her devices.  At the initialisation phase 
it should be possible for the user of the personal CA 
component to confirm the initialisation of the new 
component.  This can be done, for example, by a special 
key on the keypad of the initialisation component or by 
entering a check value into the device (see section III). 
 
The general security requirements applying to methods 
used in the personal PKI are: 
• no third party passive interceptor of 
communications can learn any secret information; 
• no third party active interceptor of communications 
can manipulate the exchanges between mobile 
device and personal CA so that a public key 
certificate is created for the incorrect device or that 
contains incorrect data (e.g. a public key other than 
that created by the mobile device); 
• the interaction between a mobile device and 
personal CA necessary to transfer the personal CA 
root certificate to the mobile device,  shall use at 
least a ‘weak’ shared secret, e.g. a shared password 
or PIN, and the method used should be capable of 
resisting ‘brute force’ attacks on the shared secret. 
 
III. IMPRINTING A MOBILE DEVICE 
 
A. A protocol for device initialisation 
 
The security requirements for the device initialisation 
process have been listed above.  In this section, a 
protocol for the device initialisation is sketched – see 
also [1].  Before giving this protocol we observe that, in 
order to operate successfully, the mobile device and CA 
must meet certain minimum requirements. 
• The personal CA must be equipped with a display 
and a simple input device for giving it commands. 
• The mobile device must possess a moderately 
sophisticated user interface – that is it must possess 
both the means for a user to input a sequence of 
digits (e.g. a numeric keypad or at least two buttons 
to insert a sequence of zeros and ones), and a 
simple output device, e.g. an audio output, to 
indicate success or failure of the initialisation 
process. 
The protocol can be modified for devices with just a 
display.  How the initialisation process might be 
performed for mobile devices which do not possess a 
numeric keypad or a display is an issue currently being 
considered by the SHAMAN project. 
Finally note that we also assume that the mobile device 
and personal CA can communicate via a wireless 
interface. 
The protocol operates as follows. 
1. The Personal CA must be reliably informed of the 
identifier for the mobile device.  This could, for 
example, be achieved by the user typing the 
identifier for the mobile device into the keyboard of 
the Personal CA.  However, it could also be 
achieved as part of the protocol itself (see below). 
2. The Personal CA sends its public key PCA to the 
mobile device, and the mobile device sends its 
public key PM to the personal CA.  This transfer is 
assumed to take place via the wireless interface.  
Along with PM, the mobile device can send any 
other information it wishes to have included in the 
public key certificate which the personal CA will 
generate (again via the wireless interface).  This 
could, for example, include the identifier for the 
mobile device. 
3. The Personal CA now generates a random key K, 
where K is suitable for use with a MAC function 
shared by the Personal CA and the mobile device.  
Using this key K, the Personal CA computes a 
MAC as a function of PCA, PM and any other data 
supplied by the mobile device.  The MAC and the 
key K are then output by the personal CA (e.g. via a 
display attached to the personal CA). 
4. The user now types the MAC and key K into the 
mobile device, which uses the key K to recompute 
the MAC value (using its stored versions of the 
public keys and associated data).  If the two values 
agree then the mobile device gives a success signal 
to the user.  Otherwise it gives a failure signal. 
5. If (and only if) the mobile device emits a success 
indication, the user instructs the personal CA to 
generate an appropriate public key certificate.  This 
certificate generation must only take place after the 
mobile device has given the required positive 
indication.  This certificate can then be sent 
(unprotected) to the mobile device via the wireless 
interface. 
6. The mobile device now performs two checks before 
accepting the certificate.  Firstly the mobile device 
checks the signature using the personal CA’s public 
key (PCA).  Secondly the mobile device verifies that 
the data fields within the certificate (including the 
public key PM and the identifier for the mobile 
device) are all as expected.  The protocol is now 
complete. 
B. Implementation considerations 
Apart from meeting the security objectives of the 
initialisation process, a further primary objective for the 
design process is to minimise the length of the data 
strings that the user has to type into the mobile device.  
This is important for several reasons. 
• Firstly, the user will wish the initialisation process 
to be as quick and simple as possible, arguing in 
favour of the minimum number of required 
keystrokes.  This is accentuated by the fact that the 
keypad on the mobile device may be rather small 
and awkward to use for large strings of data 
(notwithstanding the ability of many users of 
existing mobile devices to send text messages using 
small numeric-only keypads). 
• Secondly, the initialisation process should have a 
high probability of successful completion.  This 
will clearly not be the case if the user is required to 
enter a large number of digits, especially using a 
small keypad and/or with a small or non-existent 
display to give feedback. 
• Thirdly, if typing in long data strings is necessitated 
by the scheme, then it might be just as simple to 
type in the respective public keys, thus avoiding the 
threats that arise from use of the wireless interface. 
In the protocol described in subsection A this 
minimisation of data entry can be achieved by using a 
very short key K and a very short MAC.  For example, 
if the key and MAC both contain 4 decimal digits, then 
the probability that an attacker can successfully 
manipulate any of the information protected by the 
MAC is very small (see subsection D below). 
C. Proof of possession requirements 
In some circumstances, before generating a certificate, it 
is necessary for a CA to ensure that the requester of a 
public key certificate knows the private key 
corresponding to the submitted public key.  To provide 
this service, the mobile device could supply a ‘proof of 
possession’ of the private key in step 2 of the protocol 
specified in subsection A above. 
The nature of this proof of possession will vary 
depending on the ‘type’ of the mobile device’s 
public/private key pair.  For example, if it is a signature 
key pair, then the private key can be used to create a 
‘self-signed certificate’, i.e. a signature generated using 
the mobile device’s private key on a string containing 
the mobile device public key and the mobile device’s 
identifier. 
The nature of a proof of possession for a private 
decryption key or a private key agreement key is not so 
simple.  Preliminary analysis reveals that for decryption 
and key agreement keys giving proof of possession may 
require interactions between the personal CA and the 
client device.  The design of a single imprinting 
protocol providing both secure key exchange and proof 
of possession for these cases is the subject of further 
research within SHAMAN. 
D. Analysis of the protocol 
The purpose of the protocol described in subsection A is 
to transfer the public keys and other data needed for 
production of the certificate.  All data to be transferred 
is assumed to be public.  Therefore the security goal is 
to protect the integrity of the data, not the 
confidentiality.  The necessary integrity protection is 
performed using the MAC-based checking procedure in 
steps 3 and 4 of the protocol. 
The security threat against the protocol is an active 
adversary who by any possible means tries to modify 
the data exchanged between the CA and the mobile 
device in step 2.  If such a modification, insertion of 
new data or deletion of data takes place on the wireless 
communication between the devices, then the data sent 
by one party will be different from the data received by 
the other party. 
The adversary is successful, if the integrity protection 
method fails to detect modification of data.  In what 
follows the probability of failure is determined. 
For the security analysis of the protocol it is essential to 
observe that the communication channel used for the 
checking procedure in steps 3 and 4 is completely 
independent of the wireless communication channel 
used for other exchanges of data in the protocol. 
Also, different instances of the protocol are 
independent.  This is due to the fact that for each 
protocol instance the key K is randomly generated.  The 
key is generated independently for each protocol 
instance and for each MAC computation.  This means, 
in particular, that even if the data between two protocol 
instances are strongly related, the respective MAC 
values computed using different keys are independent.  
To achieve this randomisation property of the MAC the 
length of the key should be larger than or equal to the 
length of the MAC value. 
Let m be the bit length of the MAC and k the bit length 
of the key.  Then the adversary is successful either if he 
guesses the key K correctly, or if the guess for the key is 
not correct, but the MAC values for the different data 
happen to be the same.  Hence the probability of success 
is 
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For a fixed total length of the bit string to be entered to 
the mobile device, this probability is minimised if the 
lengths of the MAC and the key K are equal, that is, if m 
= k, in which case the success probability for an 
adversary is approximately equal to 21-k. 
 
IV. CERTIFICATE MANAGEMENT 
 
Once a mobile device has been imprinted and provided 
with a public key certificate by the personal CA, there is 
a need for ongoing management of key pairs and 
certificates.  There are three main issues which need to 
be resolved within the PAN: 
• Certificate and key pair update, i.e. methods to be 
used when a device wishes to use a new key pair or 
when the certificate for a current key pair has 
expired, 
• Key status management, i.e. disseminating 
information regarding revoked public keys across 
the PAN, and 
• Trust management, i.e. managing the relationship 
between the mobile device and the personal CA, 
including CA (root) key update and the possible 
replacement of personal CA devices (especially in 
the event of lost or stolen personal CA devices). 
We now consider each of these issues in more detail. 
A. Certificate and key pair update 
If the mobile device merely wishes to obtain a new 
certificate for an existing public key, then because of the 
scale of the personal PKI a simple solution is possible.  
Given that the total number of personal devices will be 
small it is likely to be possible for the personal CA to 
securely retain a copy of all public keys for which it 
generates certificates.  It could even routinely check the 
certificates to see if any of them have expired.  Once the 
need for a new certificate has been determined, the 
personal CA device simply asks the user if the existing 
key pair should be renewed.  Once the user has agreed, 
a new certificate can be generated and passed to the 
device concerned across the wireless interface at the 
next opportunity. 
 
Even if storing all public keys at the personal CA is not 
feasible, in certain cases it may be possible to use a 
relatively simple certificate renewal process.  The 
mobile device requiring a new certificate could pass the 
expired certificate to the personal CA which would then 
pass the relevant information to the user for a decision.  
If the user agrees a new certificate can be generated. 
 
If a new key pair is to be assigned to the mobile device, 
then the renewal process becomes more difficult.  In 
some cases it may be possible to use the old key pair to 
establish a secure exchange between personal CA and 
mobile device – however, if the key pair is still trusted 
to secure this process then it is not clear why it would 
need to be changed.  Indeed, the default for many 
inexpensive mobile devices may simply be to use the 
same key pair indefinitely. 
 
However, if a new key pair is definitely required, and if 
the old key pair cannot be used to secure the interactions 
between personal CA and mobile device, then a new 
imprinting process will probably be necessary.  Given 
that this will involve relatively few user keystrokes, and 
given also that this will probably be a rare event, this 
should not present a huge practical problem for the user. 
B. Key status management 
We consider two different ways in which certificate 
status information can be disseminated to a mobile 
device.  The choice between the two approaches 
depends on the online availability of the personal CA. 
 
The first approach we call online status dissemination.  
This is designed for use in the case where the personal 
CA is available online to every mobile device either 
permanently or at least at frequent intervals.  In the case 
where the personal CA is permanently online then an 
online status query protocol could be used, e.g. a 
protocol along the lines of the Online Certificate Status 
Protocol (OCSP) – see, for example, [2].  However, 
because of the small scale and relatively closed nature 
of the personal PKI it may be possible to use a 
simplified version of OCSP. 
 
In the case where the personal CA is not always online, 
but is nevertheless online at frequent regular intervals, 
the use of routinely distributed Certificate Revocation 
Lists (CRLs) – see, for example, X.509, [3] – would 
appear to be appropriate.  In this approach the personal 
CA generates new CRLs at regular intervals and 
distributes them automatically to all mobile devices.  
Whilst the personal CA is not online permanently, and 
neither are all mobile devices, this approach will be 
appropriate in cases where the personal CA is online 
sufficiently often that the chances of every mobile 
device having the latest CRL are very high. 
 
The second case we call ad hoc status dissemination.  
This is designed for use when the personal CA is only 
online intermittently or rarely.  In such a case, a mobile 
device may not be online at the same time as the 
personal CA very often, in which case a directly 
distributed CRL no longer seems appropriate.  Thus an 
alternative means for distributing CRLs is necessary. 
 
As in the previous case we assume that the personal CA 
generates CRLs at regular intervals.  We also suppose 
that the personal CA is online sufficiently often that it 
can distribute the latest CRL to at least one mobile 
device (if not then there is clearly no way of distributing 
timely status information).  Subsequent distribution of 
CRLs is then assumed to occur in an ad hoc fashion 
between mobile devices.  That is, whenever mobile 
devices communicate, they exchange the serial number 
of the CRLs they possess.  If one device has a higher 
serial number than the other then it passes the latest 
CRL to the other device.  By this means the latest CRL 
should disseminate across the PAN very rapidly, 
without requiring active support from the personal CA. 
 
Such an approach may even be appropriate in other 
networks.  Note, however, that in networks with a 
central or critical node through which all traffic passes, 
e.g. networks with a star topology, problems may arise 
if the certificate of the critical component is about to 
revoked and the component does not co-operate. 
C. Trust management 
We first consider the routine updating of root keys, i.e. 
when an existing personal CA wishes to update its key 
pair.  If the old root public key has not been revoked, 
then this could be achieved by distributing a certificate 
for the new root public key signed using the old CA 
private key.  Whilst this approach has dangers, it may be 
sufficiently secure for use in a PAN environment.  The 
only alternative would appear to be to engage in a new 
imprinting process with all mobile devices, which could 
be a rather onerous process for the user. 
 
The case of a compromised or stolen personal CA is 
rather more difficult.  In such a case there is a need to 
inform all mobile devices of this in a timely way.  Of 
course, once the root key has been revoked, then secure 
communications between devices will become 
impossible unless another root key (and a certificate 
signed using this key) is available.  There would appear 
to be two main approaches to dealing with this issue. 
 
The first approach is to use multiple personal CAs.  In 
this case every device will have multiple root keys and 
multiple certificates for their public key(s).  If two or 
more Personal CAs are available at the time a mobile 
device is imprinted, then it should be possible to devise 
a special version of the imprinting protocol given in 
section III.A to enable simultaneous registration and 
certificate generation.  When one CA root public key is 
to be revoked, then the mobile devices can be informed 
by the remaining personal CAs, using the same 
mechanism as is used to disseminate revocation 
information for other mobile devices. 
 
The second approach is to re-imprint every device with 
a replacement personal CA as soon as possible after the 
loss of the old personal CA.  Such a process can be 
designed to simultaneously revoke the old CA and 
register with the new CA.  An appropriately modified 
version of the imprinting protocol described in section 
III.A above will need to be used. 
 
V. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
We have introduced the “Personal CA” concept, 
designed to simplify security management within a 
PAN.  We have analysed the security requirements for 
the personal CA, and we have proposed a protocol for 
device imprinting, which combines security with 
minimal intervention by the user.  Finally we have 
considered ongoing security management issues. 
 
Although the proposed imprinting protocol appears to 
meet all the identified requirements, certain issues still 
remain, and these will be the subject of future research 
within the IST SHAMAN project.  These issues include 
the design of imprinting protocols for mobile devices 
without any keypad or similar user input capability, and 
the integration of proof of possession techniques with 
imprinting protocols for the cases of decryption and key 
agreement keys. 
 
The authors would like to acknowledge the helpful 
advice and encouragement of all their colleagues in the 
SHAMAN project, and in particular those of András 
Méhes and Scarlet Schwiderski-Grosche. 
 
REFERENCES 
 
[1] C. Gehrmann and K. Nyberg, “Enhancements to 
Bluetooth baseband security”, in Proceedings of 
Nordsec 2001, Copenhagen, November 2001. 
[2] ISO/IEC 15945: 2002, Information technology – 
Security techniques – Specification of TTP 
services to support the application of digital 
signatures.  [=ITU-T X.843]. 
[3] ITU-T X.509 (03/2000), Information technology – 
Open systems interconnection – The directory: 
Public-key and attribute certificate frameworks.  
[=ISO/IEC 9594-8: 2001]. 
[4] F. Stajano and R. Anderson, “The resurrecting 
duckling: Security for ad-hoc wireless networks”, 
in B. Christianson, B. Crispo, and M. Roe (Eds.), 
Security Protocols, 7th International Workshop 
Proceedings,  LNCS, vol. 1796, Springer, 1999, 
pp. 172-194. 
